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Introduction 
On May 14, 1911 the revolutionary forces of Francisco Madero attacked the 
northern city of Torreon in the state of Coahuila, Mexico. The following morning, they 
victoriously entered the town. With the soldiers came about 4,000 individuals from 
towns and villages throughout the region. They and the soldiers soon began a plundering 
of the city that particularly targeted Chinese immigrants. By the end of the day, 303 
Chinese and five Japanese lay dead; Chinese financial losses were estimated at over one 
million dollars. 2 While the magnitude of the attack may have been an anomaly, the 
targeting of the Chinese was not. Chinese immigrants were repeatedly persecuted and 
killed, their businesses ransacked, and communities threatened throughout the course of 
the Mexican revolution. Attacks against the Chinese continued even after the cessation of 
hostilities and end of the revolution in 1920. Legislation restricted Chinese immigration, 
prohibited marriages between Chinese and Mexicans, and segregated Chinese 
communities into ghettos. Extreme cases of persecution in the northern state of Sonora 
predicated their expulsion from that state in 1931. 
The history of the Chinese in Mexico is relatively unknown.3 Attention to foreign 
immigrants and populations in Mexico has focused primarily upon North American and 
European companies and diplomats, due in part to the economic nationalism that capped 
and followed the revolution. However, although the imperialist undertakings of North 
Americans and Europeans spurred resentment against foreign influence and calls to 
economic nationalism during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, they 
infrequently fell victim to the violence the Chinese experienced. Referring to the 
Mexican revolution, the Mexican historian Alan Knight recently wrote "historians ... in 
search of the odd persecuted gringo, pick their unseeing way through piles of Spanish and 
Chinese corpses. ,,4 A number of short works have been written on the situation of the 
Chinese during the Mexican revolution, but the foundations of anti-Chinese feeling have 
usually been glossed over.5 The following work attempts to redirect attention from the 
I would like to thank Linda B. Hall, Robert Himmerich y Valencia, Richard Coughlin, Jonathan 
Spence, Alfred Gruber, Elinore Barrett and the Latin American Institute at the University of New Mexico. 
would like to also acknowledge the extremely helpful comments and critiques of two anonymous reviewers 
at the University of New Mexico. 
2 Dambourges Jacques, "The Chinese Massacre in Torreon," 239; Cumberland, "The Sonora 
Chinese," 192. 
3 
4 
The pioneering work has been done by Evelyn Hu-DeHart in numerous articles. 
Knight, "Peasants into Patriots," 152. 
5 See for example Cumberland, "The Sonora Chinese;" Hu-DeHart, "The Chinese of Baja California 
Norte;" Dennis, "The Anti-Chinese Campaigns;" Puig, Entre el Rio Perla y el Nazas. For the Chinese in 
pre-Revolutionary Mexico, see Gomez Izquierdo, El Movimiento Antichino; Puig, Entre el Rio Perla y el 
Naza£; Hu-DeHart, "Immigrants to a Developing Society;" Hu-DeHart, "Racism and Anti-Chinese 
Persecution;" Craib, "Ethnicity and Economy." 
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"odd gringo" to the Chinese by surveying Chinese immigration, settlement, and economic 
activity as well as official attitudes towards the Chinese in the period prior to the 
revolution. 
Immigration and Identity in Porfirian Mexico 
From the expulsion of the French in 1867 until the revolution in 1910, Mexico 
entered into a period of extensive capitalist export-oriented economic development, and 
liberal, oligarchic state building and centralization.6 In 1870 Mexico suffered from a 
huge government debt, exported a small amount of some metals and agricultural stuffs, 
and enjoyed little regional infrastructural development. To remedy these problems and to 
prevent future invasions of the Mexican nation (the French had just recently been 
expelled and the United States had invaded and taken over half the nation's territory in 
1848), Porfirio Diaz emphasized strength through modernization and economic 
development. Diaz and his cientificos worked towards raising the economic level and 
infrastructure of the nation by courting foreign business and capital. The Porfirian 
political elite were united in their belief that Mexico had the potential to be rich, but that 
the necessary prerequisites to fulfilling this potential were fourfold: establishing order 
and security, developing a transportation system, eliminating institutional obstacles to 
development, and successfully promoting immigration.7 The issues of infrastructural 
development and immigration are what concern me here. 
Immigration was perceived as the key to massing the labor force necessary for 
infrastructural development, particularly in the remote mining and agricultural regions of 
the northern sierras. The scarcity of native villagers and the resistance by peasants to 
proletarianization required alternatives be found and colonization was that alternative.8 
Francisco Pimentel, a liberal intellectual and highly esteemed philologist, had previously 
written in 1866: 
En Mexico, donde la poblaci6n es tan escasa, entendemos por 
colonizaci6n no la emigracion, sino la inmigracion, y por 10 tanto, el 
modo de tratar este punto debe ser inverso al que se ve en los libros 
europeos: comenzaremos por indicar los males que resultan a un pais de 
hallarse despoblado.9 
To encourage settlement in sparsely populated areas survey companies (compafifas 
deslindadoras) were commissioned to survey, measure, divide, and appraise land for sale 
and development. First in 1875 and then again in 1883, statutes were drawn up by the 
Mexican government authorizing surveys of public land with the "principal objective [of] 
the 'colonization' of Mexico's lightly populated hinterlands [i.e. the north]."IO In a further 
attempt to attract immigrant colonists, the Ley de Extranjerfa y Naturalizaci6n (1886) 
guaranteed all foreigners, including immigrants, the same rights and privileges as 
Mexicans, although the government did retain the right to expel any "extranjero 
pernicioso." 11 
6 
7 
Knight, "Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo," 78. 
Cott, "Mexican Diplomacy," 64. 
For population figures for the period see the following works by Garcia Cubas, The Republic of 
Mexico in 1876; Cuadro Geo~nifico de Mexico; Trade and Industry . 
9 Pimentel, La Economfa Polftica, 172. 
8 
10 Holden, Mexico and the Survey, 28. 
11 Gonzalez Navarro, Poblaci6n y Sociedad, Torno II, 35-36. The information on the Ley de 
~------------------------------~~------------------------------------------------------------------
As well as assuming that European immigration would aid Mexico in its 
economic development process, liberal intellectuals had hoped that Europeans would 
both settle and mix with the native population. As Pimentel went on to assert: 
... mientras nuestra poblaci6n no mejore, y se funda en una sola raza, 
Mexico no puede aspirar al rango de naci6n propiamente dicha: naci6n 
es una reuni6n de hombres que profesan creencias comunes, que estan 
dominados por una misma idea y que tiendan a un mismo fin. En 
Mexico no hay analogfa entre los blancos y los indios; todo es 
diferente, el aspecto ffsico, el idioma, las costumbres, el estado de 
civilizaci6n. En Mexico hay dos pueblos diferentes en un mismo 
terreno, y 10 que es peor, dos pueblos hasta cierto punto enemigos .. .la 
inmigraci6n [de Europeos], en efecto, como 10 hemos dicho, ha de 
mejorar nuestra raza, ha de ilustrarnos, ha de servirnos de esti~ulo, ha 
de acrecentar la producci6n .. . '2 
3 
Colonization was thus promoted with a second objective in mind--to racially and 
culturally homogenize the nation and to ensure that this homogenizing process was also a 
Europeanizing process, imposing western legal, social, cultural and economic norms on a 
diverse population to "civilize" them. As Bonfil Batalla has succinctly noted, in Mexico, 
to "civilize" has always meant to make less Indian. 13 However, Pimentel and others were 
not advocating a racist program of anti-Indian pogroms and annihilation, although such 
efforts were made. The problem, in elite eyes, was not one of biological or racial 
inferiority, although many espoused this view, but rather of supposedly cultural 
backwardness and ideological fragmentation. 14 Pimentel wrote: 
Despues de palpar todas estas dificultades e inconvenientes, y no siendo 
justo ni posible destruir a los indios, es preciso confesar que su unico 
remedio, y con el de la naci6n toda, consiste en la trasformaci6n por 
medio de la inmigraci6n europea ... . IS 
Such a transformation would not only incorporate the native into a more western identity 
and economy but also whiten the mestizo--considered the transitional race. As such, as 
white Europeans mixed with the native population, so would they mix with the mestizo 
population, eventually resulting in "una generaci6n numerosa de blancos."16 Similarly, 
Extranjerfa y Naturalizaci6n comes from the Manuel de Extranjero, 193-20l. 
12 Pimentel, La Economfa Polftica, 186, 193. 
13 Bonfil Batalla, Mexico Profundo, 158. 14 The assertion that this was a cultural rather than racial issue is debateable. While Alan Knight 
emphasizes the importance of Spencer and Social Darwinism on late nineteenth-century Mexican 
intellectual thought, Charles Hale emphasizes the importance and influence of Comte and scientific 
positivism. See Knight, "Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo," passim; Hale, Transformation of 
Liberalism, passim. A commendable middle-ground is found by Benjamin Keen. Keen points out that 
although there were some conservative, racist proponents in the Porfirian intellectual community, the 
majority rejected such notions. See Keen, The Aztec Image, 411-62. 
15 Pimentel, La Economfa Polftica, 183. Pimentel's writings, published in 1866, coincided with the 
creation by Maximilian, in December of 1865, of the Asian Colonization Company (for the purpose of 
importing Asian labor into Mexico for the next ten years) and with the passing of a law which gave 
foreigners equal civil rights with Mexicans, for the explicit purpose of enticing foreign labor and 
immigration. See Pimentel, La Economfa Polftica, 194-195. 
16 Ibid., 183. A similar emphasis on the "whitening" of the population can be found in other areas of 
Latin America during the same period. For example, in Venezuela, European immigration was thought to 
be the answer to whitening and coopting the African population. In Brazil, the whitening of the black 
population through miscegenation was advocated by abolitionists as a means to economic development and 
--------.-----------------------------~~----------------------------------------------------------------------
Justo Sierra, although skeptical of theories popular at the time that saw miscegenation as 
debilitating, still asserted that white European immigrants were needed "so as to obtain a 
cross with the indigenous race, for only European blood can keep the level of 
4 
civilization ... from sinking, which would mean regression, not evolution. ,,17 Likewise, a 
newspaper editorial, responding directly to the possibility of bringing in Chinese laborers 
in 1871, stated that "Mexico necesita la inmigracion de las razas occidentales, gente de 
los parses cristianos, que introduzcan la moral y las costumbres de la civilizaci6n 
cristiana, su capital.,,18 
Ultimately Porfirian modernization and political stability required the formation 
of a conscious national identity in the minds of the Mexican citizenry, the creation of a 
homogenous Mexican identity; of a unique, unified Mexican ethnicity and race, or what 
Thongchai Winichakul has referred to as a "We-self.,,19 The Diaz government attempted 
to unify the Mexican nation through a process of ethnicization--that is, through a mode of 
collective organization based upon ideas of common kinship, culture, history, race and 
language which was predominantly fictional--which included the formation of a national 
ideology which validated Diaz' development model and attempted to legitimate the 
coercive power of the Porfirian state.20 
The emphasis upon the.creation of a unified, uniquely Mexican identity, by 
limiting immigration to Europeans, excluded the non-European immigrant--in particular 
the Chinese immigrant. While native groups were at least publicly perceived by the 
government as a component of the Mexican nation (albeit one to be whitened, both 
culturally and racially) the Chinese were not natives but immigrants or, even worse, 
simply workers.21 As such, they offended Porfirian sensibilities as non-European 
attracting European immigrants. The leading abolitionist politician of the late nineteenth century in Brazil, 
Joaquim Nabuco, vehemently opposed the importation of Chinese coolies in 1879 because Asian blood was 
supposedly "no better" than African blood. See Wright, Cafe con Leche and Skidmore, "Racial Ideas and 
Social Policy in Brazil." 
17 Sierra, Political Evolution, 368. 
18 El Siglo XIX, October 25 , 1871. Emphasis is mine. 
19 Knight, "Peasants into Patriots", 150. I am using Knight's definition of ethnicity as identification 
through "language, dress, religion, social organization, culture and consciousness." Knight, "Racism, 
Revolution," 73. Thongchai, Siam Mapped, 11-12.Although the idea of what the "We-self' actually is will 
often be contentious and radically variable, the actual idea that there is a "We-self' or an essence is usually 
never questioned. 
20 Balibar defines ethnicization as the "representation in the past as if a group formed a natural 
community, possessing an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals." See 
Balibar, Race. Nation. Class, 96. As van den Berghe writes: "common nationhood, so long as the fiction of 
common descent retains the appearance of plausibility, remains a powerful rationale for state power." See 
van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon, chapter 4. Emphasis is mine. 
21 In the Contrato de la Campania Mexicana de Navegaci6n del Pacifico (1884), Article 27 stated 
that the company "recibinl sesenta y cinco pesos plata fuerte por cada inmigrante europeo, y treinta y cinco 
pesos plata fuerte por cada trabajador asiatica." Valdes Lakowsky, Vinculaciones Sino-Mexicanas, 200. 
Emphasis is mine. In this case, the Chinese were "trabajadores" while Europeans garnered the more 
amiable title of "inmigrantes." As colonization by immigrants was perceived as beneficial and necessary in 
the late nineteenth century, the descriptive term "inmigrante" had a positive connotation. However, it was 
necessary to differentiate desired immigrants from undesirable ones; thus, undesirable immigrants were 
termed solely by the function they performed in the economy--"trabajadores." If we measured racial 
desirability in monetary terms, the Mexican government agreed to pay almost double for European 
immigrants what they would pay for Asian "workers." 
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immigrants who would not only not whiten the general population but would presumably 
add to the hindrance to development already posed by the native population. 
The government's stance is better understood when recalling that the Porfiristas 
interest in modernization and development coincided with the dominance of Comtean and 
Social Darwinist theories on race and civilization, which viewed other, non-European 
cultures (including both the indigenous populations of Mexico and the entire populations 
of Asia) to be in an earlier stage of development than that of western (i.e. European) 
civilization.22 Jose Covarrubias wrote in 1904: 
La teologfa no es sino una evolucion transitoria entre el fetichismo primitivo y estado 
positivo. El primero y el ultimo son estados completamente normales, susceptibles de 
duracion y consistencia, mientras que la teologfa es esencialmente inestable y transitoria. 
El estado fetichista es el punto de partida de la razon human a y de toda sociabilidad, y el 
estado positivo es el punto de llegada 0 final. 23 
Newspaper editorials, particularly in those papers catering to business interests, mirrored 
such attitudes. El Monitor Republicano, in March of 1887, spoke out against Chinese 
immigration due to "la abyeccion, vicios y fealdad de esa raza. ,,24 In the same year, El 
Siglo XIX ran an editorial casting the Chinese people as tIel mas antiguo del mundo y a su 
vez el menos civilizado."25 
Yet, if the Chinese were so antithetical to elite Mexican goals, why were they 
brought in? Jose Jorge Gomez Izquierdo summed up the reason perfectly when he wrote: 
"Sin embargo, los intereses economicos de las elites por contar con mano de obra barata y 
docil fueron mas fuertes que el temor y a la repulsa hacia los chinos. ,,26 Porfirian attempts 
to attract European immigrants were an overwhelming failure. Development Minister 
Vicente Riva Palacio, in his report to the Mexican Congress in 1876-77, attributed this 
failure partly to the Mexican government's lack of funds, lack of infrastructural 
development, and lack of civilization among the masses. 27 He stressed that potential 
immigrants from Europe "would not accept the lifestyle of the Mexican laborer. 
Furthermore, European immigrants wished to settle near population centers, where they 
were not needed."28 What the Porfirian development schema required was a willing work 
force that would work under adverse conditions, separated from family and village life, 
and for minimal wages.29 European immigrants could do far better than that in the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. 
22 Auguste Comte, the father of positivist thought, delineated human societies according to how they 
philosophized--he characterized Asian and indigenous societies as being based upon theological and 
superstitious ruminations while he lauded western societies for being rooted in objective, scientific 
philosophizing. See Comte, The Positive Philosophy, 26-28. In a similar vein, Francisco Bulnes, a 
Porfirian intellectual, categorized the human races according to the staple foods they consumed, with races 
of wheat dominating races of corn and rice. Justo Sierra asserted that even former President Benito Juarez, 
a Oaxacan Zapotec, saw that his "hermanos de origen" needed to be pulled from a state of mental abjection, 
i§norance, and superstition. Cited from Bonfil Batalla, Mexico Profundo, 153. 
2 Covarrubias, Informes, 153. 
24 Martinez Montiel and Reynoso Medina, "Inmigracion Europea," 399. 
25 El Siglo XIX, October 24, 1871. 26 Gomez Izquierdo, El Movimiento antichino, 61. 
Cott, "Mexican Diplomacy," 64. 
Ibid., 64. 
27 
28 
29 Gordon V. Krutz, "Chinese Labor," 321. Krutz' hypothesis is that violence against immigrants, 
culminating in their expUlsion, can be expected in developing countries where the immigrant represents 
Matfas Romero, a leading figure in the Mexican government from 1863 until his 
death in 1899, was one of the first to suggest the use of non-European, and especially 
Chinese, immigration as a means to acquiring the labor supply necessary for economic 
development: 
Me parece que los unicos colon os que podrfan venir a establecerse 0 a 
trabajar en nuestras costas, son los asiaticos, procedentes de climas 
semejantes a los nuestros, y principalmente de China. La numerosa 
poblacion que hay en ese vastfsimo imperio, la circunstancia de haber 
entre ella muchos agricultores, la de ser relativamente bajos los jornales 
que se les pagan y la misma proximidad al Asia de nuestras costas del 
Pacffico, harfan que la inmigracion china fuese la mas facil y al mismo 
tiempo la mas conveniente para nuestro litoral de ambos mares.30 
6 
Romero called specifically for the Mexican government to actively solicit Chinese 
immigrants. In the same article, he wrote: "Para proceder con mayor acierto, me parece 
que convendria man dar un agente a la China, encargado especialmente de estudiar todo 10 
relativo a la emigraci6n. ,,31 He was not the first to consider importing Chinese laborers to 
assist in the Mexican development process. Chinese laborers had actually been brought 
into Mexico as early as 1864 to work on the Ferrocarril Nacional Central and one year 
later Maximilian established a Chinese Colonization Company to import Asian labor for 
a period of ten years.32 Chinese expelled from Cuba began entering Mexico through in 
Veracruz in 1871, the same year in which an editorial from a Mexican newspaper 
supported the importation of Chinese coolies, avering that "para la mecanica son muy 
aptos y tienen especial predilecci6n por los ferrocarriles. ,,33 
By 1880, the Porfirian government had begun to establish contacts and 
commercial relations with China. That year the Mexican Ministry of Development wrote 
to Ignacio Mariscal, Mexico's Foreign Minister: "with the concessions for railroads to the 
Pacific soon to be granted, this Ministry believes that the moment has arrived to establish 
commercial relations with the empires of China and Japan.,,34 In 1884, the Secretaria de 
Fomento established the Compania Mexicana de Navegaci6n del Pacifico for the explicit 
purpose of bringing in Asian workers, up to a thousand per voyage, to work on the 
railways, mines, and haciendas and in the following year the Compafifa brought in nearly 
2,500 Asiatics to work on the Ferrocarril de Tehmrntepec.35 
As well as assisting in general economic development (on railroad, haciendas, and 
in mines), the Chinese were valued as a labor force to develop areas that were either 
uninhabited or lacking a participatory work force. Romero had stressed that as well as 
foreign capital to be used for development. 
30 Valdes Lakowsky, Vinculaciones, 182. Cott sums up Romero's career succinctly: "Romero was 
Mexico's minister to the United States from 1863 to 1867 and finance minister from 1868 to 1872 and 1877 
to 1879. In 1882, he returned to the Mexican Embassy in Washington, where he served for most of the 
remainder of his life." See Cott, "Mexican Diplomacy," 64-65. Romero was a well-known and 
well-respected figure in elite US circles. His death in 1899 garnered a full page obituary in National 
Geographic. 
31 Ibid., 183-184. This citation and the previous one come from Romero's editorial in Revista 
Universal, Vol. X, num. 190, dated August 20, 1875. 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Gomez Izquierdo, EI Movimiento antichino, 56. 
Ibid., 46. 
Cott, "Mexican Diplomacy", 67. 
Gomez Izquierdo, EI movimiento antichino, 56-57. 
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native populations being less inclined to work in economic development, there were areas 
where no possible work force was even available, in regions that were completely 
uninhabited. In an official letter to Romero in 1886, Ignacio Mariscal (Mexico's Foreign 
Minister) concurred: "The Chinese arriving on the Pacific coast will be in completely 
undeveloped regions, whose unhealthfulness has made them heretofore uninhabitable, 
even to Indians. ,,36 It is primarily to these regions that the Chinese would immigrate and 
settle.37 
Chinese Settlement in Mexico 
Although scattered throughout the country, the largest concentrations of Chinese 
immigrants were found in the geographical extremes of the northern frontier states and 
the Yucatan peninsula, as well as in the Distrito Federal. Geographical proximity to Cuba 
played a role in Chinese settlement in the Yucatan. In 1871 the Spanish government 
. expelled the Chinese from Cuba (through non-renewal of work contracts) for their 
perceived participation in an 1868 uprising against Spanish colonial rule. With their 
expUlsion from Cuba, many Chinese made the journey from Havana to Mexico, entering 
through Veracruz or Tampico. Although some Chinese stayed in Tampico, working in 
the service industries for petroleum industries, most either moved north to the U.S. border 
or south to the Yucatan where work was readily available. Considering the proximity of 
Cuba it is also probable that many Chinese entered the Yucatan from Cuba illegally?8 
The Chinese immigration boom for the Yucatan, as with Mexico in general, occurred in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. With only nineteen Chinese listed in the census 
for Yucatan in 1895, there were 153 by 1900 and 875 by 1910.39 Chinese laborers 
worked for the government and private companies on road and railroad construction as 
well as on henequen plantations.4O In 1904, the governor of the Yucatan, Olegario 
Molina, found "that henequen planters had formed a company for the purpose of securing 
20,000 additional workers in China."41 Those Chinese who emigrated to the Yucatan 
found themselves in a very similar situation to that in the Caribbean--a plantation 
economy (henequen) and slave-like conditions--often exchanging impoverished 
conditions in China (or the feudal, paternalist plantation of Cuba) for the same in Mexico. 
Continual allegations of abuse and mistreatment of Chinese workers on the plantations in 
the Yucatan resulted in a visit to the plantations in 1905 by a Chinese diplomat in Mexico 
City.42 
36 Cott, "Mexican Diplomacy," 73. 
37 For an insightful and comprehensive analysis of the situation in China during this period and 
Chinese relations in a global context, see Spence, The Search for Modern China, 137-268. On Chinese 
emigration see Yen, Coolies and Mandarins, Chapters 2 and 3. On the Chinese in Cuba see The Cuba 
Commission Report. On China's diplomatic relations and its impact upon emigration and protection see 
China: The Maritime Customs, vol. II; Valdes Lakowsky, Vinculaciones Sino-Mexicanas; Pardinas, 
Relaciones diplom<iticas. 
38 Considering the numerous provisions drawn up by the Spanish government to deal with Chinese 
"deserters", it seems fair to speculate that many Chinese may have illegally fled Cuba to the Yucatan with 
the help of various smuggling organizations in Havana or elsewhere. For the regulations on deserters, see 
the Cuba Commission Report, 141-156. 
39 Gomez Izquierdo, El movimiento antichino, 76-78. 
40 Cott, "Mexican Diplomacy", 71. 
41 Ibid., 71 (fn 38). 
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The majority of Chinese immigrants settled in the northern sierras of Mexico--the 
highest concentrations throughout the Porfiriato being in Sonora, Chihuahua, and the 
Baja California Norte peninsula.43 Many settled in the north as a result of governmental 
policy and the need for labor in remote, northern regions. The north was also the 
practical option for those Chinese who were coerced into leaving or physically forced out 
of the United States. Work was readily available in mines, on haciendas, on railroads, 
and in the local manufacturing and merchant economy. In addition, many Chinese used 
the northern regions of Mexico as a jumping off point for illegal entry into the United 
States, primarily through the border west of EI Paso.44 Particularly after the passage of 
the Exclusion Law in the United States in 1882, smuggling of Chinese into the U.S. 
became a big business and an organized, large-scale smuggling operation existed 
throughout Mexico, the United States and the Caribbean.45 By 1890 U.S. consular 
officials at a number of different locations in Mexico were aware of the problem and had 
even uncovered a sophisticated system whereby Chinese from Havana would arrive in 
Tampico ("a principal port of entrance of Chinamen") "with through tickets to EI Paso."46 
As with the Yucatan, both geographic and economic considerations affected the 
settlement patterns of Chinese in the north. Geographically, the Pacific northwest (Baja 
California, Sinoloa, Sonora) was the primary port of entry for most Chinese coming to 
Mexico from China. Immigrants disembarked and settled in Mazatlan, Guaymas, 
Ensenada and Salina Cruz, or moved inland to Hermosillo, Torre6n, and Chihuahua, 
working on the railroads and mines of the entire region. In Baja California Norte, 
Chinese found work in cotton fields, settling predominantly in Mexicali and Ensenada.47 
The majority of Chinese settled in the state of Sonora. Sonora's governor, Ram6n Corral, 
estimated in 1890 that the Chinese population in his state to be 229, second only to North 
Americans among foreigners. The Chinese population in Sonora was nearly 300 in 1895, 
one-third of the entire Chinese population of Mexico.48 The population exploded over the 
42 Ibid., 71. 
43 Gomez Izquierdo, El movimiento antichino, 76-79. For this paper, the north is defined as those 
Mexican states north of the Tropic of Cancer - Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, 
Durango, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo Leon. 
44 Perkins, "Reminiscences," 184. 
45 Consular officers characterized the smuggling of Chinese from Mexico into the United States as 
"an organized business ... carried on with the cognizance if not with the concealed co-operation of the local 
[Mexican] authorities." U.S. Consul Joseph Donnelly to Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day, May 
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Chinese Exclusion Law," 148. 
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course of the next decade,with over 13,000 Chinese living in Mexico by 1910.49 The 
state of Sonora, by 1910, would have the largest Chinese population in all of 
Mexico--more than four times that of the second largest concentration in the Distrito 
Federal. 
9 
Economically, northern regions of Mexico offered unique opportunities to 
populations willing to settle in an underpopulated, often isolated and violent society. The 
north was a frontier region, a region in which economic niches were still to be had, 
providing possibilities for economic gain and success. The north was also a region of 
significant dynamism. Diaz's colonization programs and modernization agenda 
stimulated new settlements and a substantial increase in population in the north; railroads 
were extended from the furthest reaches of the frontier to Mexico City; and Diaz' political 
control increased in the region. Even though it was a frontier region, there was also a 
very significant increase in the size and importance of the urban populations of the north; 
for example, Sonora grew by almost forty percent between 1895 and 1910.50 This 
urbanization spurred the growth of a vibrant Mexican middle class, made up of teachers, 
professionals, merchants, and artisans in the cities. It also facilitated the development of 
successful Chinese ventures and it was in the north that the Chinese moved from 
positions of manual labor to small-scale commercial enterprises with a noticeable success 
rate.51 
The Chinese in the Economy 
Supposedly it was once said "The Americans do all the big business, the Chinese 
do all the little business, and we Mexicans hold office and shout Viva!,,52 Although 
perhaps apocryphal, this aphorism is suggestive. Diaz relied almost exclusively on 
foreign capital for his development program. This xenophilia resulted in the 
quasi-monopolization of "big business" in Mexico by European and North American 
capital, especially capital-intensive industries such as mining, manufacturing, marketing, 
and transportation. The French owned nearly 80 percent of the textile mill industry, 
railroads were predominantly North American-owned, and North American and British 
capital monopolized the mining and oil-drilling industries. The large companies worthy 
of mention in diplomatic documents of the Porfiriato were almost exclusively European 
or North American. In 1908 British officials in Mexico noted that all mining companies 
were owned by British, Mexican, North American, or French interests while a British 
foreign service officer estimated foreign capital invested in mining and non-mining 
companies in Mexico to be more than double that of Mexican capital.53 By 1910, North 
Americans controlled the largest percentage of all foreign investment in Mexico.54 
48 
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Foreigners, employed by companies from their native land, usually occupied 
positions of higher responsibility, skill level, and wages than Mexican workers. Foremen 
and machinists in factories and mines, and conductors on railroads were usually 
foreigners, especially North Americans in North American-owned companies. A typical 
illustration is found in Torre6n, where railroad workers from the US received the highest 
wages of any workers in the region.55 A British Consular Official in Mexico wrote in 
1908: 
One of the special instances may be found on Mexican railways. The 
Presidents of the different lines are Americans or British, while the 
personnel is very largely American. This American "invasion" is 
carried so far that the guards, sleeping-car attendants, engine-drivers, 
&c., on the through trains are almost without exception foreigners, 
Americans naturally preponderating.56 
Mexican workers resented the preferential treatment foreign workers received, and in the 
first decade of the twentieth century they organized unions to protest foreign workers 
privileged positions. Although these discriminatory practices were predominantly part of 
European and North American business activities, the Chinese were frequently victims of 
the resentment they provoked. 
Although most Chinese came to Mexico as manual laborers in the 1870s, by the 
turn of the century many had become business owners and merchants.57 The expanding 
urbanization and modernization of the north intensified the need for a developed 
infrastructure of goods and services and, while the North Americans and Europeans (and 
some Mexicans) concentrated their efforts on large-capital industries, the Chinese moved 
into lower levels of the economy, working in local trade and commerce and opening 
small stores and restaurants, laundries, and pawnbrokerages.58 They quickly achieved 
particular success in the retail of dry goods and foodstuffs and as late as 1920 US consul 
Yost reported that "the trade in groceries, dry goods and general merchandise in Sonora is 
largely controlled by the Chinese.,,59 However, such enterprises worked frequently in 
conjuction with shoe and clothing manufacturing, the selling groceries, or importation of 
goods. Indeed, Chinese achieved a particularly extraordinary level of success in shoe and 
clothing manufacturing. As early as 1873, two shoe and clothing factories had been 
established by Chinese in Guaymas, Sonora and in 1892 a 27 year-old Sonoran Chinese 
merchant had a shoe business valued at seven thousand dollars.60 Prior to the revolution, 
55 William K. Meyers, "Interest Group Conflict," 180. 
Tower to Grey, General Report on Mexico for the year 1908, BDFA, 262:3. 56 57 Gomez Izquierdo posits the existence of a Chinese bourgeoisie in Sonora by the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. Gomez Izquierdo, El movimiento antichino, 58 
58 Hu-DeHart, "Immigrants to a Developing Society," 276. The most prominent retail and wholesale 
merchants were Europeans, North Americans, and Mexicans. A British consular official noted that the 
Germans "have a practical monopoly of the hardware business throughout the republic ... [and] have large 
commercial houses at Acapulco, Colima, Guaymas, &c., where they combine the hardware business with 
that of general commission and shipping agents and bankers" while the French devoted their energies to the 
"drapery trade." Tower to Grey, General Report on Mexico for the year 1908, BDFA 262:70. A British 
consular official's report of 1905 listed Chinese immigrants to be "principally engaged in laundry work, or 
[as] proprietors, or cooks or waiters in cheap restaurants." Report on the Political Situation and Principal 
Events of Interest during the Year 1905, with an Additional Chapter on the Reform of the Monetary System, 
by w.G. Max Muller. BDFA,258:VIII. 
59 Hu-DeHart, "Immigrants to a Developing Society," 279, 296. 
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Chinese owned at least ten shoe factories producing over 100,000 dollars in aggregate 
sales per year. From 1907 to 1910 all but one shirt and overall factory in Sonora was 
owned by a Chinese and they owned nearly a third of the 37 shoe factories in the entire 
state.61 Such enterprises even attracted Chinese from across the border. A Chinese 
merchant from Tucson, Arizona was stopped by the border patrol in Nogales in 1906. A 
resident of Tucson for over 25 years, he claimed that he was traveling to Guaymas to buy 
shoes to take back to Tucson and added: "I have been to Guaymas many times to buy 
cheap shoes to sell in Tucson. ,,62 
Chinese were successful in other ventures also. By 1904 a small Chinese colony 
of 150 in Agua Prieta had garnered significant influence in the agricultural and 
commercial sectors of the town's economy and,along with the Spanish, they dominated 
much of the commercial sector in the Laguna region.63 Torreon had one of the most 
prosperous Chinese communities in Mexico and was the site of the worst anti-Chinese 
outbreak during the revolution. The Chinese who came under attack in Torreon in 1911 
occupied a variety of positions and owned an assortment of businesses, from laundries 
and restaurants to hotels and banks.64 In Sonora, a poll conducted between 1905 and 
1907 showed Chinese merchants accounting for fifty-two of the state's 968 most 
important businesses. By 1919, there were at least eleven Chinese commercial 
establishments in Sonora with more than $10,000 in capital and the capital worth of 
Chinese businesses in Ensenada by 1913 was 208,000 pesos.65 
Part of their success was due to the sophisticated organization of tight 
cooperatives linking Chinese in Mexico with Chinese elsewhere, usually through 
business associations (such as the Asociacion de Comercio Chino, established in 1912 in 
Chihuahua) and fraternal organizations (like the Union Fraternal: Asociacion China del 
Estado de Sonora, located in Nogales.)66 In particular a significant link of credit and 
capital existed between a number of Chinese in Mexico and Chinese in both the United 
States and China. As early as 1890 capital from Shanghai was invested in a mine in 
Sonora; in 1889 a group of Chinese merchants from San Francisco invested 328,000 
dollars into a Baja California mine; a group of Chinese reportedly owned a financial 
house in the Distrito Federal worth one million dollars that had branches in both New 
York and Hong Kong.67 The Sonoran commercial house of Quan, Gun, Lung y Cia. 
traded directly with various cities in the United States and as far away as Hamburg, 
Germany.68 Tang Leung, a member of a Hong Kong firm, applied for a permit to enter 
the United States on business in 1898, along with three merchants representing a Chinese 
firm (with capital estimated at 40,000 to 50,000 dollars) doing business in three northern 
60 Hu-DeHart, "Immigrants to a Developing Society," 278; Vice-Consul J. Stone to Assistant 
Secretary of State William Wharton, February 11, 1892, USCG Nogales. 
61 Dambourges Jacques, "The Anti-Chinese Campaigns," 50-51; Hu-DeHart, "Immigrants to a 
Developing Society," 278. 
62 Thomas, "Los chinos en Arizona," 38. My translation. 
63 Krutz, "Chinese Labor," 327; Meyers, "Interest Group Conflict," 177. 
64 
65 
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Gomez Izquierdo, El movimiento antichino, 95. 
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Mexican cities.69 Wong Foon-Chuck, a Chinese immigrant who arrived Torreon in 1887, 
established himself as a leading importer and supplier of Chinese labor for the various 
industries of both Mexico and the U.S. southwest.70 Chinese political exile and head of 
the reformist movement, K'ang Yu-wei, helped create the Compania Bancaria Chino y 
Mexico with Foon-Chuck in 1906 in Torreon. The bank sold stock, purchased and sold 
real estate, and provided a common bank for Chinese funds from all over Mexico.71 The 
same bank constructed the first streetcar line with Mexican government concessions and 
had assets of over 900,000 dollars by 1908.72 
Economic Bases for Anti-Chinese Sentiment 
As an ethnically foreign population that interacted with the local population on a 
daily basis, the Chinese had a significantly more visible presence in the popular space and 
the common appearance to many Mexicans was that the Chinese did monopolize many 
enterprises (particularly retail clothing, wholesale dry goods and vegetable industries, and 
laundries) driving Mexicans out of work, robbing Mexican women of laundering jobs, 
hoarding foodstuffs during bad harvest years, and generally exploiting the Mexican 
populace. Although the Chinese were accused of displacing Mexican workers in the 
North, more likely they were simply meeting the needs of the local populace in a rapidly 
developing society, providing necessary goods and services. 
Attacks against the Chinese due to the economic competition they represented 
started soon after their arrival in 1871. In 1879 La Libertad, a newspaper published in the 
Distrito Federal, presented arguments against Chinese immigration. The editorial argued 
that the Chinese were not consumers since they spent little of what they earned, returned 
most of their earnings to China, and drove Mexicans out of work.73 Four years later, the 
Secretary of the Treasury of the state of Sonora, in a letter to the Secretary of 
Development of the Distrito Federal, complained about Chinese immigrants taking 
Mexican jobs, although he did not specify exactly what jobs.74 In 1891 La Revista de 
Merida argued that the Chinese represented competition for the Mexican merchant 
because Chinese did not like to work in the fields, preferring to sell fruit and foods in the 
cities.75 
When the economic situation worsened, as it did after 1893 (and especially in 
1906/07) anti-Chinese sentiment among the general populace increased substantially. 
Real wages in both agriculture and industry fell after 1900 and the dispossession of 
communities enlarged the labor pool and lowered wages.76 After the United States' 
depression of 1893, Mexican workers there were forced back across the border to their 
homeland where they found the situation no better. The Chinese were soon targeted not 
69 Consul J.F. Darnall to Acting Secretary of State J.B. Moore, May 12, 1898; Darnall to Moore, 
October 31,1898. useo Nogales. 
70 Meyers, "Interest Group Conflict," 186. 
71 Dambourges Jacques, "Chinese Massacre," 235. 
Ibid., 235. 72 
73 Dambourges Jacques, "The Anti-Chinese Campaigns," 52-53. This is the standard litany of 
complaints one finds in any society against so-called sojourners. 
74 Ibid., 18. 
75 Gonzalez Navarro, El Porfiriato, 168. 
76 Knight, "Peasant and Caudillo," 18. 
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only because of the commercial competition they represented but also because they 
displaced Mexican laborers. By 1890 there had been anti-Chinese protests in Sonora 
because Chinese laborers worked for lower wages and had replaced Mexican railroad 
workers.77 The employment of Chinese in a lumber mill in Nogales provoked a wildcat 
strike in 1891 while in 1905 the Boleo Copper Mine of Baja California expressed its 
desire to avoid employing Asians due to increasing anti-Chinese violence.78 In the same 
year the Partido Liberal Mexicano (a prohibited opposition, anarcho-syndicalist party 
under the leadership of Ricardo Flores Magon) called for an official ban on Chinese 
immigration. Article 16 of the PLM's program of 1906 simply stated: "Prohibit Chinese 
Immigration." The PLM soon elaborated on the program, declaring that such a ban was 
meant to eliminate the wage competition represented by Chinese workers who "accept the 
lowest wages": 
Su [the Chinese] competencia es funesta y hay que evitarla en Mexico. 
En general, la inmigracion china no produce a Mexico el menor 
benficio.79 
Chinese economic connections with North American companies--in particular the 
mining interests in Cananea--also increased anti-Chinese feeling. In June of 1906 Quong 
Sang Lung and Fong Fo Qui, both merchants in Sonora, appealed to the governor of 
Sonora for compensation for attacks upon their businesses by strikers of the Cananea 
Consolidated Copper Company. Both companies profited from the local North American 
industries and were perceived as catering to North American industries and interests. 
Quong claimed to have lost over 1,500 dollars in merchandise and Fong almost 300 
dollars. Both of their claims were denied by the governor's office.8o North American 
mine owners would also hire Chinese to run the local tienda de raya, at times forcing 
Mexican laborers to buy their goods there.8l 
Starting in 1899, E1 Trafico, a Sonoran newspaper popular among the merchant 
and business classes and sympathetic to labor interests and rights and "la lucha obrera", 
published a series of editorials regarding Chinese immigration. The timing for these 
editorials was essential due to the increased discussions regarding a possible treaty 
between China and Mexico: 
Al ponerse en vigencia el tratado comercial entre Mexico y el imperio 
chino, entraran a nuestro pais ... mas de diez mil celestiales y otros 
millares vendran de seguida en los vapores correo ... 82 
The editorials began as discussions of both the positive and negative aspects of Chinese 
immigration. For the business and industrial classes requiring new manual labor, Chinese 
immigration was essential. However, the editorials soon developed into "cries of alarm" 
over Chinese economic successes 
77 
78 
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Cott, "Mexican Diplomacy," 82. 
79 Cited from Gonzalez Navarro, EI Porfiriato, 169. For example, workers that worked inside the 
mines were paid as follows: U.S. workers - $12.00; Mexican workers - $5.50; Chinese workers - $2.50. 
See Trueba Lara, Los Chinos en Sonora, 40. 
80 Monte6n Gonzalez, Chinos y Antichinos, 57-58. 
8l Hu-DeHart, "La Comunidad China," 196. 
82 Trueba Lara, Los Chinos en Sonora, 35. This is from El Trdfico, 8 de febrero , 1899 - the first of 
its series of editorials on Chinese immigration. 
... . no hay barrio donde no se encuentre un comercio de abarrotes chino, 
ni esquina ni lugar a proposito donde no haya sentado sus reales un hijo 
del cielo. Parece que se disponen a dar la gran batalla al comercio al 
menudeo y que quieren monopolizarlo por completo, habiendole 
declarado una guerra a muerte a los abarroteros mexicanos al por 
menor. Todos los puntos estrategicos de Guaymas (dfgarnos) estan en 
manos de ellos y las consecuencias de esa invasi6n chinesca se veran 
muy pronto, pues si bien ahora los unicos perjudicados son los 
mexicanos que giran en pequeno, dentro de algunos anos tendran que 
resentirlas las del alto comercio ... la ropa corriente y el calzado esta en 
sus manos, nadie puede hacerles competencia, lavanderos y 
planchadores estan haciendo una guerra sin cuartel a las pobres indias ... 
comienzan ya a hacer la competencia a los panaderos con muy buen 
exito; muchos restaurantes estan en sus manos, y el comercio de 
d . 83 pesca os y marISCOS .. . 
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Editorials such as this one continued until the middle of June, moving from page two to 
page one by the middle of March. An editorial in El Pais in 1900 regarded the Chinese as 
more degenerate than the native and asserted that they ruined the Mexican worker, 
industrialist, and merchant with their competition.84 A Sonoran Catholic daily, in 1907, 
wrote that the Chinese were already "hasta tamaleros y tortilleros, y cercano esta el dfa en 
que no dejaran a la mujer otro medio lfcito de ganar dinero que el de nodriza.,,85 In 1910 
Chinese merchants in Torre6n had their businesses attacked and in May of 1911, a speech 
in Durango specifically emphasized economic grievances against Chinese--they replaced 
Mexican women in the laundry business, were economic and employment competitors, 
and dominated the grocery, vegetable, and gardening industries.86 Along with a variety of 
negative ideas on the nature and actions of Chinese came the usual threats of 
Chinese/Mexican miscegenation, Chinese health conditions, and "bad" religious 
influences. The dominant aspect, however, of the arguments is that of the commercial 
threat of the Chinese. 
The competitive argument was intensified and reinforced by a downturn in the 
economy of northern Mexico. The combination of the shift to the gold standard in 1905 
and the economic crisis on Wall Street in 1907/08 severely depressed the Mexican 
economy. By 1908 northern states were having to deal with the return of a large number 
of Mexican workers from the United States, leading to a saturation of labor in the market 
and high unemployment.8? The United States increased the number of border guards to 
stifle smuggling operations and undertook the deportation of thousands of Mexican 
workers.88 Another result of the depression was that the market for mining output 
slumped and prices for primary products worsened, severly impacting the mines of 
northern Mexico.89 In addition, two years of drought culminated in extremely bad 
83 Monte6n Gonzalez, Chinos y Antichinos, 39. The March 1, 1899 editorial was entitled "EI 
comercio al por menor. Un grito de alarma." El Trdfico, p. 2. The general conclusion was that the Chinese 
were not desirable as a race but Chinese immigration should be tolerated in order to achieve as rapid a 
modernization as possible. As it could not be expected that white European immigrants would come to do 
the manual labor necessary, the entrance of the Chinese coolie would have to suffice. 
84 Gonzalez Navarro, EI Porfiriato, 169. 
85 Cited in ibid., 169. 86 
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88 
Darnbourges Jacques , "The Chinese Massacre," 237. 
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harvests in 1908 and 1909. By 1908 food was very scarce in the Laguna region. Com 
and beans, the staples of the populace, after having risen in price threefold in the course 
of a year were nowhere to be found. 90 A local paper, El Nuevo Mundo, blamed 
speculators and merchants for hoarding food and overcharging.91 As the Chinese grew 
much of the local vegetable crops and owned many local foodstores, they were frequently 
the object of such attacks.92 
Reactions to the depression included widespread strikes by workers, rural 
uprisings, and increased middle class discontent. High unemployment resulted in the 
exacerbation of class and ethnic conflicts resulting from the high foreign presence in 
Mexico and the variations in pay, benefits, and general treatment between foreign and 
Mexican workers.93 In light of the increasingly dire situation, the PLM stepped up its 
calls for the expulsion of foreigners and foreign interests in Mexico. The depression also 
had a significant impact on the middle classes of northern Mexico. Although a rural 
middle class had developed in the north prior to independence in 1810, it was after 1880 
that the rise and growth of both an urban and rural Mexican middle class in the north was 
most pronounced.94 This class was made up of merchants, professionals, artisans, and 
miners. The Mexican petit bourgeios was primarily mestizo, occupying positions in 
commerce, industry, and the local government, typically possessing energy and ambition 
but not capital, influence, or property.95 Although speaking of the Laguna region in 
particular, the following assertion is applicable to the north as a whole: "as a class they 
[the Mexican middle class] seemed to have absorbed' all the costs but few of the benefits 
of the region's development. ,,96 This new middle class endured major losses in the crash 
of 1907 (largely due to real estate ventures), suffered from economic insecurities, and 
were excluded from the circulation of political power. With such economic problems, 
this "prototypical petit bourgeois" became particularly sensitive to nationalist ideas and 
viewed Diaz' autocratic style and xenophilia as a major obstacle to economic success.97 
In June of 1907, a group of Mexican merchants in Torre6n created a Chamber of 
Commerce in an attempt to consolidate their power against foreign merchants. Their 
credo was published on the front page of El Nuevo Mundo: 
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Let's call attention to the fact that we cannot compete against the foreigner in commercial 
ventures; in fact, we cannot even come close. The sad and lamentable fact is that the 
prostration of our national commerce has created a situation in which Mexicans are 
replaced by foreign individuals and companies which monopolize our commerce and 
behave in the manner of conquerors in a conquered land.98 
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Although not specifically mentioning the Chinese, this editorial was most likely directed 
at both the Chinese and the Spanish--the most significant competitors in commercial 
industries. 
All of this intensified the arguments against Chinese immigration and settlement 
and exacerbated anti-Chinese attitudes in the north, provoking a number of other 
responses. Both official and popular groups began to look for ways to reduce the 
influence and success of the Chinese in the country. New active assaults were initiated 
against the Chinese, focusing on health conditions as an excuse for segregating and 
ghettoizing the sector of the population and for limiting their immigration. 
Contagion and Isolation 
Although questions of national identity and economic competition represent the 
major reasons for increasing anti-Chinese sentiment in Porfirian Mexico, justifications for 
discrimination were also non-economic in nature. The most common non-economic 
portrayal of the Chinese was as unhygienic and dirty. Concerns over health and sanitation 
caused by epidemics became an excuse to justify discrimination against the Chinese and 
to limit their economic competition. In fact, the issue of health was probably the most 
widespread and intense non-economic issue concerning Chinese immigrants and 
represented a very effectual image for swaying the popular mind and became a focal point 
for arguments for the ghettoization of the Chinese population. 
One historian, discussing the Chinese in Porfirian Mexico, recently wrote that: 
Los men os, generalmente los positivistas, vieron como virtudes 10 que 
sus enemigos juzgaban vicios; eran industriosos, econ6micos, sobrios y 
respetuosos, en suma, eficaces 'motores de sangre,.99 
They were seen, like the Jewish population of Europe, "as both parasitic and idle, yet also 
industrious and overly successful."loo The paradox of course proved ultimately 
devastating for the Chinese communities. Chinese were frequently accused of being 
morally corrupt, opium addicts, wife-beaters, and virtually evil incarnate. Alan Knight 
has recently written that "even today [1980], stories redolent of medieval anti-Semitism 
concerning the abduction and ritual murder of Mexican infants by Chinese are told in 
northern Mexico."101 The most common form of anti-Chinese prejudice, however, was to 
blame them for many of the various epidemics and illnesses which struck the Mexican 
populace, due in large part to what were considered the unsanitary living conditions of the 
Chinese. 
Attacks against Chinese hygiene and sanitation expressed the increasing prejudice 
against both existing Chinese communities and newly arriving immigrants. These attacks 
revolved around a number of specific issues, most importantly the close (in western eyes 
"packed" and overcrowded) quarters within which the Chinese lived. lo2 Overcrowded 
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living situations were repugnant to Mexican elites and urban dwellers; mirroring social 
concerns of European life such attitudes provoked fears of epidemic, death, and moral 
corruption. 103 For example, it was a commonly held assumption that Chinese living 
quarters were "un foco de infecci6n" and calls came for the ghettoization of the Chinese 
in a barrio" de los mas distantes del centro [del pueblo]." 104 Chinese houses and shops 
were thought to be infected with most diseases known, and some unknown, to 
humankind. In Sonora, a Dr. Iglesias assured a patient that she had contracted leprosy 
from the shop of a Chinese immigrant and ghettoization soon became necessary as the 
Chinese constituted "un elemento nocivo por su baja condici6n y repugnantes 
costumbres."105 El Pais stated that the Chinese brought the "mal asiatico", trachoma, and 
"la sarna." 106 
Sickness and deprivation soon became certain signs of moral and racial 
degeneracy. As early as 1871 an editorial in El Siglo XIX characterized the Chinese as 
"medianamente higienica" and suffering from a lack of moral fortitude.107 El Trafico 
(1899) justified regulation of Chinese communities by comparing their moral standards 
with prostitution and put out a call for the people to rise en masse against Chinese 
integration: 
EI pueblo en masa deberfa de protestar contra la presencia de los chinos 
confudidos con nosotros, y pedir su inmediata remosi6n a un barrio 
donde la nifiez este exenta del contagio de sus costumbres.108 
In various newspaper editorials, Chinese were accused of having "pasiones de mal 
genero," "perverse tendencies", bad habits, and corrupted morals. 109 In an editorial to the 
Sonoran Governor, El Trafico listed a series of complaints against the Chinese of which 
the following was one: 
Que estando la salubridad publica constantemente amenezada por la 
desidia absoluta que observan con respeto a los mas rudimentarios 
preceptos de la higiene, pues viven aglomerados en casas suficientes 
apenas para albergar a la cuarta parte de los que en elIas habitan y 
tienen la pesima y reprobable costumbre de arrojar inmundicias en el 
interior de dichas habitaciones. "o 
homes. The jailed Chinese, however, had to be released because their jail celI did not conform to the new 
law. See Yen, Coolies and Mandarins, 214-15 (fn 41). 
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classes, or more particularly, domestic servants. In doing so, elites shifted the blame from social conditions 
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the slums, become the agents of disease." The outcome was the regulation of domestic servants in Rio 
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Allegations such as these continued throughout the first decade of the twentieth century. 
Attacks motivated by economic or political interests continuously used issues of health 
and hygiene to denegrate the Chinese. In November of 1911, the Union de Comerciantes 
al Menudeo in Mazath'in distributed a small publication requesting official assistance in 
erradicating the alleged Chinese threat: 
Muy pocos somos 10 que conocemos en la intimidad a los chinos ... 
hacinados, sudando a chorros y despidiendo olores meffticos y 
cacoquinos ... fijan sus ojos de felino en la figurita de una baraja 0 en el 
numero de una diminuta pieza de domin6, en sus pocilgas ... haremos 
campana en su contra. I II 
While repugnant, the focus upon health conditions and hygiene is understandable; 
epidemics and disease harried the country, and in 1903 a sweeping outbreak of Bubonic 
Plague coursed through northwestern Mexico. The plague outbreak was especially bad in 
Mazatlan, a significant port of entry for Chinese and goods arriving from San Francisco. 
The Chinese were suspected as the carriers of the latest outbreak of plague and the 
investigation as to its origins centered entirely around the Chinese. U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State H.D. Peirce, inquiring about how the plague reached Mazatlan, 
requested statistics on the number of Chinese vessels arriving from China or Panama with 
Chinese aboard. In response, the U.S. Consul Louis Kaiser telegraphed: "No vessels 
direct or [?] from China arrive here no Chinamen arrived from Panama here in 
conjunction of national sanitary am investigating origin of plague, no results." 112 
Although Kaiser later reported that "no vessels, either directly or indirectly sailing from 
China or Japan called in this port" in 1900-1902, he jumped to the conclusion that there 
was no "doubt that rots [rats] among vegetables shipped direct from Chinatown in Frisco 
have brought plague here." 113 
The official reactions to Chinese culpability were immediate. In 1903 officials at 
the border were advised to quarantine all items coming from San Francisco to Mexico, 
especially items in the care of the Chinese. A letter from Ram6n Garay, a Mexican 
bureaucrat, requested that U.S. officials quarantine all merchandise arriving from San 
Francisco over land. 
A cabo de saber que procedente de San Francisco California, va para 
Guaymas carga consignada a cas os 0 individuos de nacionalidad 
china, como esa carga pudiera llevar ratas 0 ratones infestados, del 
puerto de San Francisco, suplico a Ud. se sirva alquilar un cuarto donde 
se pueda hacer la desinfecci6n por medio de azufre, de la carga que 
llegue por ferrocarril y examinar bulto por bulto para saber si no lleva 
ratas 0 ratones. 114 
Garay even went as far as to suggest exactly how the inspectors should go about killing 
those rats they possibly found: "Si se teme que esto pudiera suceder sirvase Ud. arreglar 
las cosas de manera que al saltar esos animales caigan en agua hirviendo."115 
110 
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Within the year, an official, legal response was legislated. On October 10, 1903 a 
new law pertaining to Chinese immigration was passed specifically "relating to the 
landing of Chinese in Mexico, and the sanitary regulations govern same."1l6 The law, 
among other things, accorded the use of health inspections by Mexican authorities at the 
port of departure and the construction of a Barracks of Observation at the port of 
Manzanillo, where all future Chinese immigrants were to disembark. 117 The law did 
provide that "when the number of passengers or immigrants does not exceed ten, they 
may land at [the official ports of entry of] Acapulco, San BIas, Mazatllin, Guaymas, 
Tampico, Vera Cruz, or Coatzacoalcos." I 18 
The entire investigative effort centered solely around the Chinese, even to the 
exclusion of the Japanese. Although "Asiatics" were generally considered uncivilized 
and unsanitary heathens, the Japanese were typically characterized as more "western", and 
therefore more civilized, than the Chinese. To cite one example, Francisco Bulnes wrote: 
El hecho que es mas sorprende es que China habiendo estado en 
contacto con la civilizacion europea muchisimo antes que el Japon, esa 
nacion que asombra por su poder de asimilacion, mientras que China 
asombra par su resistencia a la civilizacion modern a al grado de hace 
(sic) creer que es completamente refractaria. 119 
Francisco Dfaz Covarrubias, who visited East Asia in 1875, markedly preferred Japan 
over China, in large part due to its attitudes towards modernization and the attempts it 
was making to "civilize" itself.l2O Finally, Dfaz' immigration commission (1903) had 
itself recommended that Japanese immigration be favored over Chinese or Korean 
immigration. 
The plague epidemic of 1903 and the enactment of the new law regarding Asian 
immigration is one of the dominant events that permanently established the Chinese 
community as more than simply an alleged economic threat to the Mexican 
populace--they also represented a health threat to society. The dominant response was to 
call for the ghettoization of the Chinese. The United States was used as a specific model 
for the ghettoization solution to the "Chinese problem." The United States was in many 
ways looked upon by Mexican elites as a model for Mexican development and 
modernization; it was supposedly politically unified, democratic, and liberal; and it was 
predominantly racially and culturally European (white and western). Hence, U.S. 
expulsion of the Chinese further legitimated, if not in practice at least in perception, 
prejudice and discrimination against Chinese communities in Mexico. A front-page 
editorial in a newspaper in Guaymas (1899) read: 
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En los Estados Unidos, pais liberal por excelencia y en cuya ley 
fundamental se dan a los extranjeros las mismas prerrogativas que les 
dan nuestras leyes se han hecho una excepcion de los chinos 
sujetandolos primero a determinados cuarteles, despues prohibiendo su 
entrada al pais y finalmente promulgando leyes que les quitan el 
derecho que tienen los de mas extranjeros, de nacionalizarse y hasta el 
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Local newspaper editors and business owners soon called for ghettoization and 
segregation along the lines of the Exclusion Act of the United States. One week after the 
above editorial, an editorial in EI Trdfico appealed to state governor Corral to emulate the 
United States ("pafs eminentemente liberal y practico") by isolating the existing Chinese 
population in certain areas "para aminorar. .. la perniciosa infIuencia que ejercen.,,122 In a 
1903 report to Dfaz regarding the desirability of continued Asian immigration, Genaro 
Raigosa wrote: "if in other societies more vigorously constituted and more advanced in 
their evolution, Aso-European hybridization has proved unacceptable, in our country it 
would seem to assume positively pernicious characteristics ... . " 123 It is fairly obvious that 
Raigosa was referring to the United States. No official legislation was enacted in 
response to these calls, but they continued, until finally in 1916 the Mexican government 
enacted legislation creating Chinese ghettos and restricting Chinese commercial 
operations. 124 
Calls for Chinese segregation were ultimately part of a developing nationalism by 
political elites combined with growing economic fears on the part of the general 
populace. Chinese mixing and prosperity was unacceptable to the state and its goals, 
considering that the Chinese had originally been brought in as a labor source. 
Ghettoization and segregation were thought to be the answer to fulfilling the need to 
purify the national type (preserving the forming Mexican identity from mixing and further 
heterogeneity) and to limiting the economic threat the urban Chinese were perceived as 
exercising. At the same time, ghettoization could be justified as the result of vast cultural 
and linguistic differences--a process that was the result of the "nature" of the Chinese 
themselves rather than of any conscious decision by the state. Reporting for Dfaz' 
Commission on Immigration (1903), Jose Marfa Romero wrote: 
La mas grave y seria consideraci6n que puede aducirse contra esta 
inmigraci6n asiatica es de orden social, y se funda en la comprobada 
experiencia de que la raza china no se amalgarna con los pueblos 
modernos de origen europeo ni es asimilable a la civilizaci6n 
occidental... viven en grupos aislados y extrafios a la poblaci6n 
homogenea. 125 
Claims such as Romero's, casting the Chinese as non-assimilationist, were common. 
Even more important, the structure of many Chinese communities led many to 
believe the Chinese had no desire to assimilate or participate. They occupied certain 
economic niches, "monopolized" industries such as laundries, groceries, and 
pawnbrokerages, lived in close quarters in Chinatowns, and maintained extensive 
business, familial, and ethnic ties with other Chinese both in and outside of Mexico. All 
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of this, in a certain context, could be construed as non-assimilationist--indeed, even as 
Chinese (or foreign) exploitation of the Mexican people and nation. 
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Nonetheless, despite the views of the Mexican establishment that the Chinese 
were unassimilable, the Chinese were already integrated into society in many ways. The 
Chinese, more than any other foreign population in Mexico, became naturalized citizens. 
In addition, Chinese frequently hispanicized their own names. The owner of Quan, Gun, 
Lung y Cia., a large commercial house with branches in Cananea, was a Chinese who 
hispanicized his name. 126 Successful business owner Juan Lung Tain, president Martin 
Wong of the Union Fraternal (a Chinese business association), and numerous other 
merchants and manufacturers likewise adopted Spanish first names. 127 Chinese also 
hispanicized the names of their businesses. Ton Tay, in Hermosillo, referred to his 
general merchandise shop as "La Barata"; a manufacturer of clothing and shoes adopted 
the business name "La Mariposa"; Quong Man Long y Cia. was also known as "EI 
Globo"; Tac Fo Lung Y Cia, with three different stores in Guaymas, went under the name 
"La Estrella"; and the shoe and clothing business of Juan Wong Cun y co. was known as 
"El Sol." 128 Chinese also attempted to integrate by marrying Mexican women, 
particularly as very few Chinese women came to Mexico prior to the tum of the century. 
Although not outlawed, miscegenation between Chinese and Mexicans was informally 
prohibited and officially frowned upon. A particularly virulent strain of anti-Chinese 
sentiment revolved around the supposed weakness of offspring produced by 
ChineselMexican parents. The paradox for the Chinese of course was that they were not 
permitted to mix with the local population, and yet if they did not they were accused of 
being non-assimilationist. By the outbreak of the revolution in 1911, marriage between 
Mexicans and Chinese (as well as Africans) was officially prohibited in the Plan de 
Jalisco. 129 
Ultimately, attempts at integration failed not because Chinese were isolationist, 
although this may certainly have been the case at times, but largely because what was 
really understood, in the nationalist context, by integration or amalgamation was 
conformity to Porfirian ideals of national ethnicity and the "face" of the nation. The 
Chinese were not "assimilable" because they did not conform to the mythical "national 
type" that was being created. Neither did they conform to the acceptable immigrant 
"type." The status group membership of inmigrante did not include the Chinese, being 
reserved solely for white Europeans. 
Additionally, this difficult situation for the Chinese was often exacerbated 
precisely because they were "local" foreigners, partially integrated but still ethnically 
distinguishable, highly visible, and official pariahs. Chinese economic success did not 
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have the impersonal, foreign personality of the mining industries owned by 
estadounidenses, British oil interests, and French textile factories. The Chinese, even 
more than the Spanish, were the largest permanent foreign population that lived, worked, 
and socialized within the common Mexican community. As such, they were easy, visible 
scapegoats, officially ostracized to the margins of the national community and 
antagonized as a threat to national stability and racial purity; unofficially, in the popular 
mind, they were economic threats--displacing Mexican workers, overcharging locals, 
monopolizing certain industries--and a visible reminder of the high foreign presence 
dominating the Porfirian state. They were also considered a threat to public health and 
safety as they allegedly carried and transmitted deadly diseases such as the Plague 
By the tum of the century structures of discrimination and attempts at segregation 
became more overt. The institutional, "macroenvironmental" climate of Porfirian society 
began to formally assert itself, particularly in political and judicial attitudes. 130 The most 
visible place where this shift takes place is in the new measures sought and finally 
adopted regarding Chinese immigration into Mexico, reflecting an increasing trend 
towards overt discrimination, "justifiable segregation", and removal from the national 
space. In 1903/04, Dfaz established an immigration commission (Comisi6n de 
Inmigraci6n, encargada de estudiar la influencia social y econ6mica de la inmigraci6n 
asiatica en Mexico) ostensibly to review Asian immigration and its legal, economic, 
social, and moral effects upon the Mexican nation.131 The more likely reasons were 
probably increasing pressure from commercial interests in the northern states and the 
outbreak of Bubonic Plague in the northwestern port cities.132 The commission's findings 
were presented to Interior Minister Corral (the former Governor of Sonora) in 1904. 
Among other things, the commission found that first, permanent Asian immigration was 
undesirable; second, that temporary immigration designed to meet the economic needs of 
the country should be permitted but should also be regulated according to certain 
conditions: that Japanese immigration be preferred over Chinese or Korean immigration; 
that distinctions be made between voluntary and contracted immigration, with voluntary 
immigration being subject only to health regulations while contract immigration being 
more tightly controlled; and finally that Mexican immigration companies should be 
responsible for repatriating Chinese after their contracts were completed. 133 
The restrictions suggested were not immediately adopted. Genaro Raigosa, the 
president of the commission, asserted that this was due to a decline in Chinese 
130 Bernard Wong has argued convincingly, in a comparison of Chinese assimilation in Lima, Peru 
and New York City, U.S.A., that the dominant factor in assimilation or non-assimilation was the 
"macroenvironmental" variable of the larger (or recipient) society, specifically the politicaVlegal, social, 
and economic factors. Chinese assimilation in New York City was muted and has remained so up to today 
due to the combination of harsh immigration policies against Chinese immigrants, overt and often violent 
racism, and discriminatory laws (particularly those that prohibited intermarriage and miscegenation). In 
contrast, Chinese coming to Peru faced some subtle racism but no severe legal restrictions, discriminatory 
policies, or violent attacks. Chinese laborers on plantations suffered the same harsh mistreatment and abuse 
that was found in Cuba, the Yucatan peninsula, and in other plantation economies, but this was abuse 
directed at a "peon" or manual, slave/laborer rather than specifically at a Chinese because he was Chinese. 
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immigration in the latter half of 1904 and the continual movement of Chinese immigrants 
from Mexico into the United States. 134 Restriction was also opposed for economic 
reasons. The Porfirian positivists well understood that the country could not stand to lose 
the valuable source of labor it had acquired in the Chinese. Jose Covarrubias wrote in the 
Revista Positivista in 1904: 
tenemos, pues, sencillamente, que pensar en asociarlos a nuestra 
actividad, puesto que necesitamos de su cooperacion como condicion 
indispensable de desarrollo. Que esa asociaci6n nos es ventajosa 
econ6micamente, a pesar de la extracci6n de la parte de nuestro 
asociado fuera del pais, es indudable, puesto que nosotros 
representaremos la parte del capital y los chinos la del trabajo, y es ya 
axiomatico que esta ulitma es desproporcionalmente menor que 
aquella .. . su trabajo constituye una necesidad econ6mica para nuestro 
pais.135 
Private employers also wanted to ensure the continued immigration of Chinese laborers. 
Although the Chinese had successfully moved into the petit bourgeois strata of Mexican 
society, many immigrants still worked as manual laborers on the railroads, in the mines, 
and on the plantations and haciendas. The owners of these industries still required large 
supplies of cheap labor that the Chinese could offer. In 1906 industries in the Laguna 
region actively sought Chinese and Japanese immigrants due to the exodus to the U.S. 
southwest by Mexican workers for better pay and working conditions. An editorial in 
The Mexican Herald in 1906 stated that "Chinese laborers are being brought to northern 
Mexico as quickly as employment agencies can bring them", prompting the local 
newspaper EI Nuevo Mundo to respond one month later: "The Republic is becoming full 
of Chinese, Japanese, Arabs, and Turks."J36 Until 1907 the situation remained 
unchanged. Although declared socially unsuitable, both private and official economic 
interests continued to dictate the course of immigration policies. 
These policies changed drastically with the economic crisis of 1907. With the 
return of large numbers of Mexican workers from the United States, the labor shortage for 
industrialists and landowners in northern Mexico was over. At the same time, resentment 
against foreigners (in particular the Chinese) justified the limiting of labor immigration. 
Within the year, the commission's recommendations had begun to be fully implemented 
and a legislative product was written and passed into law. 
The law, the provisions of which had been under consideration for the better part 
of a year, was enacted in the Autumn session of the Mexican Congress of 1908 during the 
middle of Mexico's most severe economic crisis in decades.137 The act amended the 
Mexican Constitution's article on Immigration and Sanitary Laws to restrict the "free 
entry of foreigners into the republic. ,,138 In enacting the legislation, the official 
commission wrote in 1908: 
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principalmente en la inmigraci6n ... pero 10 que Mexico necesita es la 
transfusi6n de sangre pura y vigorosa, la importaci6n de hombres sanos 
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de cuerpo y sanos de espiritu, y el gobierno tiene no s610 el derecho, 
sino tambien el deber de efectuar en los inmigrantes un selecci6n 
prudente y sabia. 139 
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Although the Mexican government denied that the bill was meant to hinder Asian (and 
particularly Chinese) immigration, the commission reasoned that the Bubonic Plague 
epidemic of 1903, attributed to the Chinese, had been a result of the fact that no 
"selective" measures concerning immigration had been in effective use at the time. The 
summation of a British consular official in 1908 flatly stated that the provisions of the bill 
had been "drawn up chiefly with a view to restricting the immigration of Chinese coolies 
and other Asiatics into Mexico."140 The official went on to write: 
the [Mexican] Government especially disclaim all intention of 
discriminating against any country or any race and assert that the 
prohibitions contained in the Bill are only those absolutely 
indispensable to prevent the free entry of persons who are notoriously 
harmful from a moral or sanitary standpoint, and that in view of the 
scarcity of labour throughout the republic they have no wish to hinder 
the influx of foreign labourers ... that the measure is primarily directed 
against Asiatic immigration is, however, proved by the fact that the Bill 
prohibits the entry into the country... of persons suffering from 
tuberculosis, leprosy, beri-beri, trachoma, the itch, &c., while persons 
suffering from bubonic plague, cholera, yellow fever, cerebrospinal 
meningitis, typhoid fever, exanthematic typhus, erysipelas, measles, 
scarlet fever, small-pox, or diptheria are allowed to land and to remain 
under treatment in the lazeratto of the port of disembarkation until they 
are cured. 141 
The government wasted no time in applying the newly adopted law. Later that 
year, the China Commercial Steamship Company appealed to His Majesty's Legation for 
assistance due to the "wholesale rejection of Chinese immigrants by the Mexican Health 
Officer at Salina CruZ."142 Four hundred and four (of five hundred and eighteen) Chinese 
were not permitted entry due to health reasons--specifically trachoma--although they had 
been cleared by the health official at Hong Kong. The British consular official went on to 
write that: 
On arrival at Salina Cruz of the vessels to which I have referred, Dr. 
Valenzuela, the Mexican Health Officer there, rejected a very large 
number of the immigrants. Independent medical testimony conflicted 
with Dr. Valenzuela's decision, but the Mexican Government upheld 
their official. 143 
Subsequent Chinese arrivals were treated similarly. 
In his Annual Report on Mexico for 1909, the British consular officer in Mexico 
reported that "there do not appear to have been any difficulties such as occured in the 
preceding year in regard to the immigration of Japanese and Chinese coolies into 
Mexico ... [the] Chinese still arrive in large quantities and undoubtedly considerable 
numbers of them still succeed in making their way across the frontier into the United 
States."I44 However, the immigration bill of 1908 restricting Asiatic immigration 
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remained in force, reflecting the permanence of new ideas on what the role of the Chinese 
in the state was to be; if not ghettoized, immigration could at least be stemmed. 
Epilogue 
Two years later, a combination of economic and ethnic nationalism and 
revolutionary opportunism proved ultimately devastating to the Chinese. During the 
revolutionary years they were repeatedly the subject of violent attacks in Hermosillo, 
Guaymas, Cananea, Nacozari, and other northern areas. Additionally, as middle class 
revolutionaries came to power, they enacted state legislation against Chinese 
communities. By 1915, Chinese were subject to a special head tax in Baja California and 
were ordered into ghettos by the municipal government of Mazatlan in the state of 
Sinaloa. 145 In 1917 the state of Sonora under the leadership of Plutarco Elfas Calles 
segregated the Chinese into special zones "to reduce the radius of action of the [Chinese] 
colony. ,,146 To the revolutionary middle class of the north, the Chinese were the 
consummate foreign menace. The Chinese were both an immigrant population reflecting 
Diaz' xenophilia and "dirty", unhealthy foreigners. More importantly, Chinese 
immigrants were seen as a foreign petit bourgeois standing in the way of Mexican social 
and economic mobility. The nortenos perceived the Chinese as a hinderance to the 
movement of the developing middle class into areas of commercial enterprise because of 
the economic niche they occupied. By the end of the revolution in 1920, a variety of 
anti-Chinese legislation in the north, particularly in Sonora, was adopted--prohibiting 
Chinese/Mexican marriages, limiting further immigration, and requiring Chinese to hire 
Mexican workers (the 80 percent law). Finally, in 1931, the Chinese were expelled from 
the state of Sonora, with most Chinese attempting to flee to the United States while some 
moved east to the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila. 
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